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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
In passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Congress altered the regulatory scheme for local telephone 
service. The Act requires that local service, which was 
previously operated as a monopoly overseen by the several 
states, be opened to competition according to standards 
established by federal law. Under the Act, the incumbent 
local telephone service carriers must negotiate or arbitrate 
agreements with competitive local carriers, allowing 
entering carriers either to connect their equipment to the 
existing network or to purchase or lease elements and 
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services of the existing network. The terms, rates, and 
conditions of such arrangements are set forth in 
interconnection agreements established between the 
carriers. The state utility commissions are empowered, but 
not required, to review and give final approval to 
interconnection agreements to ensure that they comport 
with federal law. 
 
Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc. (Verizon -- known at that time 
as Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc.), the incumbent local 
carrier in Pennsylvania, entered into negotiations with 
MCI/Worldcom (Worldcom), a competing carrier which 
sought to provide local telephone service. After various 
negotiations and arbitrations by the Pennsylvania Public 
Utility Commission (PUC), the parties established an 
interconnection agreement and submitted it to the PUC 
which approved it contingent on certain revisions and the 
incorporation of certain rates. Worldcom then brought suit 
in federal court against Verizon, the PUC, and the PUC 
Commissioners, under 47 U.S.C. S 252(e)(6), the judicial 
review provision of the Act, to challenge certain terms of the 
agreement; Verizon counterclaimed and cross-claimed to 
challenge other aspects of the agreement. The PUC and 
PUC Commissioners moved to dismiss the action, arguing 
that they were immune from suit under the Eleventh 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The District 
Court rejected the immunity claim and the PUC did not 
appeal at that time. The District Court then resolved all the 
substantive claims asserted by Worldcom and Verizon. The 
PUC and Verizon each appealed and the appeals were 
consolidated. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction to review the 
interconnection agreement pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 
S 252(e)(6) and had general federal question jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331. We have jurisdiction over the 
final decision of a District Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the PUC 
and the Commissioners are not entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court under the 
1996 Act. We will, therefore, affirm the decision of the 
District Court on this issue. On the questions, raised by 
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Verizon and the PUC regarding the terms of the 
interconnection agreement, we will affirm the District Court 
in part and reverse it in part. 
 
I. Statutory Background 
 
Prior to 1996, local telephone service operated as a 
monopoly, subject to exclusive regulation by the several 
states. In each local service area, the states would grant a 
monopoly franchise to one local exchange carrier, which 
owned the facilities and equipment necessary to provide 
telephone service. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 
U.S. 366, 370 (1999) (Iowa Utils. I). With the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress fundamentally 
restructured local telephone markets by eliminating state- 
granted local service monopolies. See id. The Act preempts 
exclusive state regulation of local monopolies in favor of the 
competitive scheme established in 47 U.S.C. SS 251 and 
252. See AT&T Communications v. Bellsouth Telecomm. Inc., 
238 F.3d 636, 641 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 252 
F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2001) (Bellsouth). 
 
The Act essentially requires incumbent local exchange 
carriers (ILECs) to share their networks and services with 
competitors seeking entry into the local service market. See 
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 
328 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 896 (2001). 
Under the Act, a new entrant to the local telephone market, 
known as a competitive local exchange carrier (CLEC), is 
able to compete with an ILEC without having to bear the 
prohibitive cost of building its own telecommunications 
network. See id. Both an ILEC and a CLEC are required to 
"negotiate in good faith" the "terms and conditions of 
agreements" which will permit the CLEC, as well as other 
providers, to share the network and to provide service. 47 
U.S.C. S 251(c)(1). The FCC is empowered to promulgate 
regulations to implement the requirements of the Act. 47 
U.S.C. S 251(d)(1); see also Iowa Utils. I , 525 U.S. at 384 
(upholding FCC rulemaking authority, including its power 
to determine the methodology for establishing prices). 
 
Section 251 and FCC regulations establish three methods 
of providing a CLEC access to a local network. See Iowa 
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Utils. I, 525 U.S. at 370; GTE South, Inc. v. Morrison, 199 
F.3d 733, 737 (4th Cir. 1999). First, a CLEC may build its 
own network and "interconnect" with the incumbent 
network. 47 U.S.C. S 251(c)(2). Such interconnection must 
be, inter alia, for the "transmission and routing of telephone 
exchange service and exchange access," 47 U.S.C. 
S 251(c)(2)(A), "at any technically feasible point within the 
[incumbent] carrier's network," 47 U.S.C.S 251(c)(2)(B), and 
"on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, 
and nondiscriminatory." 47 U.S.C. S 251(c)(2)(D), 47 C.F.R. 
S 51.305. An ILEC which denies a CLEC access to the 
network at a particular point must "prove to the state 
commission that interconnection at that point is not 
technically feasible." 47 C.F.R. S 51.305(e). 
 
Second, a CLEC may lease individual elements of the 
existing network on an "unbundled basis" at"any 
technically feasible point" on "rates, terms, and conditions 
that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory." 47 
U.S.C. S 251(c)(3), 47 C.F.R. SS 51.307-51.319. A network 
element is "a facility or equipment used in the provision of 
a telecommunications service," i.e.,"features, functions, 
and capabilities that are provided by means of such facility 
or equipment, including subscriber numbers, databases, 
signaling systems, and information sufficient for billing and 
collection or used in the transmission, routing or other 
provision of a telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. 
S 153(29). The FCC determines the network elements that 
must be made available for purposes of S 251(c)(3); in so 
doing, it must consider 1) whether access to proprietary 
network elements is necessary and 2) whether the failure to 
provide access to a given element would "impair" the ability 
of the CLEC to provide services. 47 U.S.C. S 251(d)(2). 
 
Lease rates for network elements must be based on 
forward-looking costs, meaning the sum of the "total 
element long-run incremental cost of the element," plus a 
reasonable allocation of "forward-looking common costs." 
47 C.F.R. S 51.505(a)(1), (2). Total element long-run 
incremental cost, or TELRIC, is the "forward-looking cost 
over the long run of the total quantity of the facilities and 
functions that are directly attributable to, or reasonably 
identifiable as incremental to, such element." 47 C.F.R. 
S 51.505(b). 
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Third, a CLEC may purchase from the ILEC for resale"at 
wholesale rates any telecommunications service the carrier 
provides at retail to subscribers who are not 
telecommunications carriers." 47 U.S.C. S 251(c)(4)(A), 47 
C.F.R. SS 51.601-51.617. In other words, the CLEC will 
purchase telecommunications service from the ILEC at 
wholesale rates and resell those services to customers. 
Telecommunications service is defined as "the offering of 
telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to 
such classes of users as to be effectively available directly 
to the public, regardless of the facilities used." 47 U.S.C. 
S 153(46). Telecommunications, in turn, means"the 
transmission, between or among points specified by the 
user, of information of the user's choosing, without change 
in the form or content of the information as sent and 
received." 47 U.S.C. S 153(43). 
 
The FCC established a wholesale pricing standard for 
S 251(c)(4), equal to "the rate for the telecommunications 
service, less avoided retail costs." 47 C.F.R.S 51.607. The 
regulations define avoided retail costs as "those costs that 
reasonably can be avoided when an incumbent ILEC 
provides a telecommunication service for resale at 
wholesale rates to a requesting carrier." 47 C.F.R. 
S 51.609(b). The Eighth Circuit has, however, struck down 
that pricing standard as contrary to the Act. See Iowa Utils. 
Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744, 755-56 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. 
granted in part, denied in relevant part, 121 S. Ct. 878 
(2001) (Iowa Utils. II). 
 
In addition, in gaining access to a local network, a CLEC 
must be permitted to physically collocate on the ILEC's 
premises any equipment necessary for interconnection or 
for access to unbundled network elements, on rates, terms, 
and conditions that are just, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory. 47 U.S.C. S 251(c)(6). An ILEC may 
provide for virtual collocation instead if it demonstrates 
that physical collocation is not practical for technical 
reasons or because of space limitations. 47 U.S.C. 
S 251(c)(6). 
 
Section 252 sets out the process by which 
interconnection agreements between ILECs and CLECs are 
to be established. See MCI, 222 F.3d at 328; GTE South, 
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199 F.3d at 737. An incumbent and a requesting carrier 
may "negotiate and enter into a binding agreement." 47 
U.S.C. S 252(a)(1). Such negotiations generally will begin 
with a request for interconnection by the CLEC. 47 U.S.C. 
S 252(a)(1). At any time during negotiations, either party 
may ask the state utility commission to participate in 
negotiations and mediate any differences. 47 U.S.C. 
S 252(a)(2). The Act's clear preference is for such negotiated 
agreements. See Iowa Utils. I, 525 U.S. at 405 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). An agreement 
reached through negotiation need not conform to all the 
detailed, specific requirements of S 251; negotiation 
consequently bestows a benefit to those carriers able to 
resolve issues through negotiation and compromise. See 
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. U.S. West Communications, 204 
F.3d 1262, 1266 (9th Cir. 2000); 47 U.S.C. S 252(a)(1). A 
negotiated agreement must merely be nondiscriminatory to 
a carrier not a party to the agreement and also be in the 
public interest. See 47 U.S.C. S 252(e)(2)(A). 
 
Negotiations may, however, prove unsuccessful. Cf. GTE 
South, 199 F.3d at 737 (stating that it is hard to see how 
negotiations would not fail). Either party, during the period 
from 135 to 160 days after a CLEC's request for 
interconnection, may petition a state utility commission to 
arbitrate any unresolved issues. 47 U.S.C. S 252(b)(1). The 
Act and FCC regulations detail the procedures and 
standards that the state must follow in conducting the 
arbitration. 47 U.S.C. S 252(b), (c), (d); MCI, 222 F.3d at 
328. The state utility commission must resolve all the 
issues raised in the arbitration and may impose appropriate 
conditions on the parties in order to resolve those issues. 
47 U.S.C. S 252(b)(4)(C). When a state utility commission 
engages in arbitration, it must ensure that resolution of the 
issues and any conditions imposed on the parties to the 
arbitration meet the requirements of S 251 and of the FCC 
regulations, it must establish any rates, and it must 
provide a schedule for implementation of the terms and 
conditions by the parties to the agreement. 47 U.S.C. 
S 252(c). The arbitrated terms are incorporated into the 
parties' interconnection agreement. 
 
Any interconnection agreement, whether reached through 
negotiation or arbitration, must be submitted to the state 
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utility commission, which "shall approve or reject the 
agreement, with written findings as to any deficiencies." 47 
U.S.C. S 252(e)(1). The standards for the commission's 
review depend, however, on whether the agreement was 
reached by negotiation or by arbitration. A state 
commission may reject a negotiated agreement only if it 
finds that 1) the agreement discriminates against a carrier 
not a party to the agreement or 2) implementation of the 
agreement would not be consistent with the "public 
interest, convenience, and necessity." 47 U.S.C. 
S 252(e)(2)(A); see also MCI v. U.S. West , 204 F.3d at 1266. 
A state utility commission may reject an arbitrated 
agreement, or part of an arbitrated agreement, if it finds 
that the agreement, or part of the agreement, does not meet 
the requirements of S 251, including FCC regulations under 
S 251, or the pricing standards of S 252(d). 47 U.S.C. 
S 252(e)(2)(B); see also MCI, 222 F.3d at 328-29. If the state 
utility commission does not act to approve or reject a 
negotiated agreement within 90 days of its submission or 
an arbitrated agreement within 30 days of submission, the 
agreement "shall be deemed approved." See  47 U.S.C. 
S 252(e)(4); 47 C.F.R. S 51.801(c). 
 
If a state utility commission "fails to act" to carry out any 
of its responsibilities under S 252, the FCC is to assume 
responsibility and act in place of the state commission in 
carrying out these duties. 47 U.S.C. S 252(e)(5); 47 C.F.R. 
S 51.803-51.807. Pursuant to FCC regulations, a state 
utility commission "fails to act" if it fails to respond within 
a reasonable amount of time to a request for mediation or 
arbitration. 47 C.F.R. S 51.801(b). If a state utility 
commission fails to act, the carrier's exclusive remedy is to 
present the issues and agreement to the FCC and to seek 
judicial review of any FCC determinations on those issues. 
47 U.S.C. S 252(e)(4); see also MCI, 222 F.3d at 329. A state 
commission does not fail to act if, because of the 
commission's inaction, an agreement is deemed approved. 
47 C.F.R. S 51.801(c). As the Seventh Circuit explained, 
sections 252(e)(1), (e)(4), and (e)(5) together"create a 
scheme that provides regulatory oversight of 
interconnection agreements, either by a state commission 
or by the FCC in the state commission's place." See MCI, 
222 F.3d at 329. 
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When a state utility commission has approved or rejected 
an agreement under S 252(e)(1), "any party aggrieved by 
such determination may bring an action in an appropriate 
Federal district court to determine whether the agreement 
or statement meets the requirements" of SS 251 and 252. 
47 U.S.C. S 252(e)(6). No state court has jurisdiction to 
review the actions of a state commission in approving or 
rejecting an interconnection agreement. 47 U.S.C. 
S 252(e)(4). 
 
II. Litigation Background 
 
Worldcom requested interconnection and began 
negotiations with incumbent carrier Verizon for an 
agreement to permit Worldcom to provide local service in 
Pennsylvania. Certain issues were not resolved by 
negotiation. The parties then went to arbitration before the 
PUC, which issued orders resolving those issues and 
requiring the arbitrated terms to be incorporated into the 
final agreement. After continued negotiations and additional 
rulings from the PUC, the parties reached a final agreement 
and submitted it to the PUC, which approved it contingent 
on certain revisions and the incorporation of certain rates. 
 
Worldcom then brought suit under S 252(e)(6) in federal 
court, naming as defendants the PUC, several individual 
PUC Commissioners, and Verizon. The suit challenged 
several terms of the approved agreement. AT&T 
Communications of Pennsylvania (AT&T), another CLEC 
seeking to gain entry into local telephone service, 
intervened as a plaintiff. Verizon counterclaimed against 
Worldcom and AT&T and cross-claimed against the PUC to 
challenge other aspects of the agreement. The United States 
intervened as a plaintiff in order to defend the 
constitutionality of S 252(e)(6). 
 
The PUC and the Commissioners moved to dismiss the 
action on Eleventh Amendment grounds, arguing that they 
had sovereign immunity from suit in federal court under 
the Act and that S 252(e)(6), which authorized the suit, was 
unconstitutional. The District Court denied the motions.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court also rejected PUC challenges to the Act under the 
Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, S 8, cl. 1, and the Tenth 
Amendment. None of these issues has, however, been raised in the 
present appeal. 
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The PUC and the Commissioners did not at that time 
appeal the denial of their Eleventh Amendment immunity 
claim. 
 
Because there were no disputed issues of fact, the parties 
then cross-moved for summary judgment. The Magistrate 
Judge made a Report and Recommendation, which the 
District Court adopted in part and rejected in part. The 
District Court considered and resolved five issues that now 
are on appeal before this Court. 
 
The first issue concerns interconnection in Local Access 
and Transport Areas (LATAs). The PUC had required that 
Worldcom interconnect in each access tandem serving area, 
rather than at a single point within each LATA. An access 
tandem serving area is a geographic area containing several 
local switches that subtend a single access tandem switch. 
Each LATA contains at least one access tandem area, but 
some LATAs in Pennsylvania contain more than one. The 
PUC's order required Worldcom to interconnect at each 
tandem switch, even if it already had connected at another 
point within that LATA. The District Court vacated that 
term of the interconnection agreement as contrary to the 
Act. 
 
Second, the PUC had required Verizon to permit 
Worldcom to collocate remote switching modules (RSMs) in 
Verizon's central offices. RSMs are devices used for 
interconnection. An RSM also contains switches with the 
limited capability of so-called line-to-line switching, 
switching calls between two customers, each of whom is 
served by unbundled loops. An RSM can be used to access 
unbundled loops and to interconnect to them, but it can 
also switch calls between Worldcom customers. In other 
words, RSMs are a single piece of equipment that enables 
the CLEC to perform several functions, including both 
interconnection and switching. Verizon contended that an 
RSM was not "necessary" for interconnection and that 
Verizon could not be required to permit collocation of such 
equipment. The Magistrate Judge and District Court 
rejected this argument and affirmed that portion of the 
interconnection agreement. 
 
Third, the PUC had required Verizon to sell directory 
publishing services at wholesale rates as a 
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telecommunications service. Directory publishing services 
include basic listings with customer telephone numbers, as 
well as additional services such as vanity numbers, bold 
and foreign listings in the White Pages, and non-listing and 
non-publication of customers' telephone numbers. Verizon 
argued that directory publishing services were not 
telecommunications services under the Act. The Magistrate 
Judge rejected this argument, but the District Court 
accepted it and struck down this provision of the 
agreement. 
 
Fourth, the PUC had established wholesale rates to be 
charged to Worldcom for resale of telecommunications 
services. Verizon objected to the rates, but the District 
Court rejected Verizon's argument and affirmed the PUC- 
approved rates contained in the agreement. 
 
Fifth, the PUC had established the prices to be charged 
for unbundled network elements, using what it called 
TSLRIC, or total service long-run incremental cost, 
methodology. Worldcom argued that the PUC had not used 
the required forward-looking TELRIC methodology 
established by the FCC. The District Court agreed and 
remanded to the PUC for it to establish new rates using the 
proper TELRIC methodology. 
 
The PUC and Verizon both timely appealed the decisions 
of the District Court; the appeals were consolidated. 
 
III. Sovereign Immunity 
 
We first address the PUC's and Commissioners' appeal of 
the District Court's rejection of their claims of sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.2  Our review of a 
District Court's denial of sovereign immunity is plenary. 
See Lavia v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 
194-95 (3d Cir. 2000). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We consolidated oral argument on the sovereign immunity issues in 
this case with the same issues raised in Bell Atl.-Pennsylvania, Inc. v. 
Pennsylvania Public Util. Comm'n, Nos. 00-2619, 00-2620, decided this 
day. The legal issues and arguments and our resolution of them are the 
same in both cases. 
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A. Background to the Eleventh Amendment 
 
We begin with an overview of Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence. That amendment has been interpreted to 
make states generally immune from suit by private parties 
in federal court. See Board of Tr. of Univ. of Alabama v. 
Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 962 (2001); College Sav. Bank v. 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 669-70 (1999); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 
521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Lavia, 224 F.3d at 195. 
This immunity extends to state agencies and departments. 
See C.H., ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 
2000) (en banc). 
 
Eleventh Amendment immunity is subject to three 
exceptions: 1) congressional abrogation, 2) state waiver, 
and 3) suits against individual state officers for prospective 
relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law. 
 
First, Congress may, in some limited circumstances, 
abrogate sovereign immunity and authorize suits against 
states. If a statute has been passed pursuant to 
congressional power under S 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to enforce the provisions of that amendment, 
Congress can abrogate a state's sovereign immunity. See 
Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 962; College Savings , 527 U.S. at 670; 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, S 5 (1868).3  Congress may not, 
however, abrogate state sovereign immunity when a statute 
is passed pursuant to its Article I powers, such as the 
Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, S 8, cl. 3. See Garrett, 
121 S. Ct. 962; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73 (holding 
that the Eleventh Amendment limits the federal judicial 
power and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the 
constitutional limits placed on the courts). The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 was clearly a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. A federal statute does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity 
where the statute, although purportedly passed pursuant to S 5, is not 
appropriate S 5 legislation because it goes beyond the scope of what the 
Fourteenth Amendment itself protects. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 962; id. 
at 967-68 (holding that nonconsenting states could not be sued under 
Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, which accorded more 
protection to disabled persons than did the Equal Protection Clause). 
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congressional exercise of its Commerce Clause power. 
Congress did not, and could not, abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in providing for federal court review 
in S 252(e)(6). Abrogation is not implicated here. 
 
Second, a state may waive sovereign immunity by 
consenting to suit. See College Savings, 527 U.S. at 670 
(citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883)). The 
waiver by the state must be voluntary and our test for 
determining voluntariness is a stringent one. See College 
Savings, 527 U.S. at 675 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. 
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)). The state either must 
voluntarily invoke our jurisdiction by bringing suit (not the 
case here) or must make a " `clear declaration' that it 
intends to submit itself to our jurisdiction." See College 
Savings, 527 U.S. at 676 (citing Great Northern Life Ins. Co. 
v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944)). The decision to waive 
immunity must be an "altogether voluntary" one, and, as 
with any other waiver of a constitutional right, there must 
be an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right or privilege." College Savings , 527 U.S. at 681- 
82. 
 
The difficult question we now face is how do we infer 
waiver from a state's actions. To answer this question, we 
must turn to the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
College Savings. There, the Court held that a suit against a 
state agency under the Trademark Remedy Clarification 
Act, alleging that the state agency had made false and 
misleading advertising statements, was barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. See College Savings, 527 U.S. at 
691. The Court held that the state's sovereign immunity 
was not validly abrogated by the Act and not voluntarily 
waived by the state's mere participation in an activity in 
interstate commerce, such as providing student loan 
services and advertising those services. See id.  
 
The Court, in rejecting waiver of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity in College Savings, overturned the constructive 
waiver doctrine formerly established in Parden v. Terminal 
R. of Alabama State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). See 
College Savings, 527 U.S. at 680 ("Whatever may remain of 
our decision in Parden is expressly overruled."); id. ("We 
think that the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden 
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was ill conceived, and see no merit in attempting to salvage 
any remnant of it."). Parden involved the operation by a 
state of a railroad in interstate commerce. In Parden, the 
Court had held that, if the state had notice when it entered 
a field which was subject to congressional oversight or 
regulation that it would be subject to suit in federal court, 
then the state was deemed to have waived immunity and 
consented to suit. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192 (concluding that 
state, when it began operation of a railroad in interstate 
commerce, 20 years after the enactment of the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act, necessarily consented to such suit 
as was authorized by the Act). 
 
Since College Savings, a state's mere participation in a 
federally regulated activity no longer may be understood as 
a constructive waiver of state sovereign immunity and 
consent to suit in federal court. Congress no longer may 
statutorily coerce a state into relinquishing its sovereign 
immunity on threat of the state being excluded from 
participating in an otherwise lawful and permissible 
activity. See College Savings, 527 U.S. at 687; see also id. 
at 683 ("Recognizing a congressional power to exact 
constructive waivers of sovereign immunity through the 
exercise of Article I powers would also, as a practical 
matter, permit Congress to circumvent the antiabrogation 
holding of Seminole Tribe."). 
 
But the College Savings Court distinguished and left 
intact conditional types of constructive waiver as previously 
established in two cases. In Petty v. Missouri Bridge 
Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1959), two states entered 
into an interstate compact, approved by Congress, that 
contained a sue-or-be-sued clause. The Court held that the 
states assumed the conditions, such as consent to suit, 
that Congress attached to the compact by accepting the 
conditions and acting on the compact containing those 
conditions. See id. at 281-82. In South Dakota v. Dole, 483 
U.S. 203, 208-09 (1987), the Court upheld a federal law, 
passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, U.S. Const. art. 
I, S 8, cl. 1, that conditioned a state's receipt of federal 
highway funds on the establishment of a minimum 
drinking age of 21 in the state; the Court found that the 
condition on the funds was clearly stated and that 
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acceptance of the funds entailed agreement to those 
conditions. 
 
The College Savings Court described these cases as 
"fundamentally different" from Parden-type forced 
constructive waivers because both the grant of consent to 
form an interstate compact and the disbursement of federal 
monies are congressionally bestowed gifts or gratuities, 
which Congress is under no obligation to make, which a 
state is not otherwise entitled to receive, and to which 
Congress can attach whatever conditions it chooses. See 
College Savings, 527 U.S. at 686-87. A waiver in return for 
receiving a benefit which a state could not otherwise enjoy 
is very different from a situation, such as in College Savings 
or Parden, where a state's refusal to consent to the 
condition of being sued would result in a congressionally 
imposed sanction, i.e., the exclusion of the state from 
activities in which it otherwise was legally permitted to 
engage. 
 
A fair reading of College Savings suggests that Congress 
may, pursuant to its regulatory power under the Commerce 
Clause, require a state to waive immunity in order to 
engage in an activity in which the state may not engage 
absent congressional approval, or in order to receive a 
benefit to which the state is not entitled absent a grant or 
gift from Congress. Four of our sister circuits have adopted 
this understanding of College Savings, recognizing that 
"gift" or "gratuity" waivers are permissible under a law 
passed pursuant to Article I powers, provided that Congress 
made its intent to require a waiver of immunity clear and 
unambiguous. See Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 
240 F.3d 279, 292 (4th Cir.) (recognizing congressional 
power to impose gift waiver, so long as its intent to do so 
is clear), cert. granted in part, 121 S. Ct. 2548 (2001); 
Bellsouth, supra, 238 F.3d at 645 (5th Cir.) ("[A]fter College 
Savings, Congress may still obtain a non-verbal voluntary 
waiver of a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity if the 
waiver can be inferred from the state's conduct in accepting 
a gratuity after being given clear and unambiguous 
statutory notice that it was conditioned on waiver of 
immunity."); MCI, supra, 222 F.3d at 339-40 (7th Cir.) 
(holding that College Savings set boundaries on 
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congressional attempts to obtain waivers from states but 
that it endorsed certain types of waivers, such as in Dole 
and Petty); id. at 344 ("We believe that College Savings does 
not alter the principle that states may waive their immunity 
by accepting a benefit from Congress that has conditions 
attached to that acceptance."); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 216 F.3d 929, 937 (10th Cir. 
2000) (Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah) (reading College 
Savings as permitting constructive waivers that are 
voluntary, meaning waivers given in order to obtain a gift or 
gratuity that would be denied if the state refuses to consent 
to suit in federal court), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1167 
(2001). 
 
Congress must be unmistakably clear and unambiguous 
in stating its intent to condition receipt of the gratuity on 
the state's consent to waive its sovereign immunity and to 
be sued in federal court. See Atascadero State Hosp., 473 
U.S. at 247. This requirement that Congress speak with a 
"clear voice" ensures that the states exercise their choice 
knowingly and voluntarily, cognizant of the consequence 
(waiver of constitutional immunity) of participating in the 
permitted activity. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (Pennhurst I). 
 
The third exception to the Eleventh Amendment is the 
doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), under 
which individual state officers can be sued in their 
individual capacities for prospective injunctive and 
declaratory relief to end continuing or ongoing violations of 
federal law. In Young, the Supreme Court held that the 
Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit a federal court from 
enjoining a state attorney general from enforcing an 
unconstitutional state law. The theory behind Young is that 
a suit to halt the enforcement of a state law in conflict with 
the federal constitution is an action against the individual 
officer charged with that enforcement and ceases to be an 
action against the state to which sovereign immunity 
extends; the officer is stripped of his official or 
representative character and becomes subject to the 
consequences of his individual conduct. See Young, 209 
U.S. at 159-60; see also Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 103 (1984) (Pennhurst II) (stating 
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that, under the theory of Young, an action for prospective 
relief against the state officer was not an action against the 
state because the allegation of a violation of federal law 
would strip the officer of his official authority). The relief 
sought must be prospective, declaratory, or injunctive relief 
governing an officer's future conduct and cannot be 
retrospective, such as money damages. See Pennhurst II, 
465 U.S. at 102-03. 
 
The Young doctrine is accepted as necessary to permit 
federal courts to vindicate federal rights and to hold state 
officials responsible to the "supreme authority of the United 
States." See id. at 105. The doctrine applies both to 
violations of the United States Constitution and to 
violations of federal statutes. See Balgowan v. New Jersey, 
115 F.3d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that suit for 
declaratory relief against state officer under Fair Labor 
Standards Act is permissible under Young); see also 
Allegheny County Sanitary Auth. v. U.S.E.P.A., 732 F.2d 
1167, 1174 (3d Cir. 1984). However, Young does not apply 
if, although the action is nominally against individual 
officers, the state is the real, substantial party in interest 
and the suit in fact is against the state. See Pennhurst II, 
465 U.S. at 101. 
 
Some confusion has arisen as to the scope and 
application of Young as a result of the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Coeur d'Alene. There, an Indian tribe 
brought suit against Idaho state officers arguing that, 
under federal law, the Tribe should hold title to the banks, 
bed, and submerged lands of Lake Coeur d'Alene and the 
various navigable rivers and streams forming part of its 
waterway. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 264. A five- 
Justice majority concluded that Young did not permit the 
action because the Tribe's suit, although brought against 
individual officers for prospective relief from an ongoing 
violation of federal law, was the functional equivalent of a 
quiet title action against the state, which, if successful, 
would divest the state of title and sovereign control over the 
waters and submerged lands. See id. at 283. Submerged 
land beneath navigable waters has a unique status in law 
and is infused with a public trust; state ownership of such 
lands has been "considered an essential attribute of 
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sovereignty." See id. (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted); id. at 287-88 (emphasizing the ties between the 
waters and submerged lands and the state's own dignity 
and sovereignty and the severance and diminishment of 
that sovereignty were prospective relief to be granted); id. at 
296 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) ("Where a plaintiff seeks to divest the State of all 
regulatory power over submerged lands--in effect, to invoke 
a federal court's jurisdiction to quiet title to sovereign lands 
--it simply cannot be said that the suit is not a suit against 
the State."). 
 
The principal opinion in Coeur d'Alene, authored by 
Justice Kennedy, garnered five votes in its determination 
that the Tribe's action was equivalent to a quiet title action 
against the state itself and was barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment. Justice Kennedy's opinion also suggested, 
however, that Young is not applicable to every case in 
which prospective relief is sought against an individual 
officer from an ongoing violation of federal law. See 521 
U.S. at 270 (describing that view as adhering to an"empty 
formalism" and undermining the real limits imposed by the 
Eleventh Amendment). Rather, Justice Kennedy suggested 
that Young applies primarily in two instances: where there 
is no state forum available to vindicate federal rights, see 
id., and where the case calls for the interpretation of federal 
law. See id. at 274. Justice Kennedy urged that there 
always be a careful balancing and accommodation of 
federal and broad state interests when determining whether 
Young applies, applying a case-by-case balancing approach. 
See id. at 278. 
 
The portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion adopting this 
narrowed view of Young was joined only by the Chief 
Justice. In a separate opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, sharply criticized the 
replacement of a "straightforward inquiry into whether a 
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and 
seeks relief properly characterized as prospective with a 
vague balancing test that purports to account for a`broad' 
range of factors." Id. at 296 (O'Connor, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment); see id.  at 291 
(criticizing the principal opinion as unnecessarily narrowing 
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Young without warrant); id. at 296-97 ("I would not narrow 
our Young doctrine."); see also id.  at 297-98 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (stating that Justice O'Connor had rejected the 
call for case-by-case balancing in applying Young and 
expressing "great satisfaction" that this view is the 
controlling one). 
 
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Coeur d'Alene cannot be 
read to establish the controlling standard for Young. Seven 
Justices rejected such a balancing and agreed that Young 
generally should apply when an action against a state 
officer alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks 
prospective relief. See id. at 296 (O'Connor, J., joined by 
Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment); id. at 298-99 (Souter, J., joined by 
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). The Fifth 
Circuit has held that, because a majority of the Supreme 
Court would adhere to the more traditional application of 
Young, the Fifth Circuit would also continue to do so. See 
Bellsouth, 238 F.3d at 648-49 (quoting Earles v. State Bd. 
of Certified Pub. Accountants of Louisiana, 139 F.3d 1033, 
1039 (5th Cir. 1998)). We agree and similarly hold that 
Young continues to permit actions against state officers for 
prospective relief from ongoing violations of federal law; no 
case-by-case balancing is necessary or proper. 
 
Coeur d'Alene did carve out one narrow exception to 
Young: An action cannot be maintained under Young in 
those unique and special circumstances in which the suit 
against the state officer affects a unique or essential 
attribute of state sovereignty, such that the action must be 
understood as one against the state. One example of such 
special, essential, or fundamental sovereignty is a state's 
title, control, possession, and ownership of water and land, 
which is equivalent to its control over funds of the state 
treasury. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 287; id. at 296-97 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). This exception is best understood as an 
application of the general rule that Young does not permit 
actions that, although nominally against state officials, in 
reality are against the state itself. See Pennhurst II, 465 
U.S. at 102. 
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In addition, the Court in Seminole Tribe has carved out a 
second exception to Young. Young will not apply where 
Congress has created a detailed remedial scheme for the 
enforcement of a federal statutory right against a state. See 
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74. The statute at issue in 
Seminole Tribe was the Indian Gaming Regulation Act 
(IGRA), under which Congress established a limited set of 
remedies and detailed, elaborate procedures for obtaining 
those remedies. Pursuant to IGRA, the state was under an 
obligation to negotiate with a tribe in good faith and if a 
court found that the tribe had failed to do so, the sole 
remedy was for a court to order the state and the tribe to 
conclude a compact within 60 days. See id. If the parties 
did not complete the compact within that time, the sole 
sanction was that each party was to present a proposed 
compact to a mediator, who would choose the compact best 
embodying federal law. See id. If the state still failed to 
comply, the tribe was to notify the Secretary of the Interior, 
who would prescribe regulations. See id. at 74-75. This 
limited remedy contrasted with the full panoply of 
prospective judicial remedies available in an action against 
individual officers under Young, including contempt 
sanctions for violation of an injunction. See id. at 75. 
Where, as in IGRA, Congress has created such a detailed 
and limited remedial scheme in the statute itself, a federal 
court cannot obtain jurisdiction through Young  over an 
action against state officers which seeks a remedy beyond 
that which Congress itself has made available against the 
state under federal law. 
 
B. The Eleventh Amendment and S 252(e)(6)  
 
With this overview of the Eleventh Amendment in mind, 
we turn to the question whether S 252(e)(6), providing for 
federal court review of an interconnection agreement 
approved by a state utility commission, violates the PUC's 
and the Commissioners' Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity. We are not the first court of appeals to address 
this question. The Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have 
all concluded that S 252(e)(6) does not violate the Eleventh 
Amendment, both because the state utility commissions 
knowingly and voluntarily waived immunity by accepting 
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the congressionally bestowed gratuity of participating in the 
process of approving interconnection agreements, fully 
aware that they would be subject to suit under S 252(e)(6), 
and because Young permits suits for prospective relief 
against individual commissioners. See Bellsouth , supra, 238 
F.3d 636 (5th Cir.); MCI, supra, 222 F.3d 323 (7th Cir.); 
Public Serv. Comm'n, supra, 216 F.3d 929 (10th Cir.). The 
Sixth Circuit also held that a S 252(e)(6) action was not 
barred, relying solely on Young. See Michigan Bell Tel. v. 
Climax Tel. Co., 202 F.3d 862 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. 
Ct. 54 (2000). Only the Fourth Circuit, over a dissent, has 
reached a different conclusion, holding that actions against 
state commissions and commissioners are barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. See Bell Atl. Md., 240 F.3d 279 (4th 
Cir.); see also Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc. v. North Carolina 





We will first consider whether the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, by taking control of local telephone companies 
away from the states and then giving back to them the 
option of participating in local telecommunications 
regulation, has established the type of gratuity or gift 
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity that the College 
Savings Court recognized as permitted under Commerce 
Clause powers. We must answer two questions: 1) whether 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on both parts of the 
sovereign immunity question in Bell Atl. Md. and also in a case from the 
Seventh Circuit, Mathias v. Worldcom Tech., Inc. , 121 S. Ct. 1224 (2001). 
The cases have been consolidated for oral argument. We have 
determined, however, that we should resolve the legal issues before us 
and not await the Supreme Court's decision on sovereign immunity. The 
reason we do so is consistent with the purpose of the 1996 Act -- to 
establish competition in local telephone service as quickly and 
expeditiously as possible. We cannot reach the merits of our appeals 
until we have resolved the issue of sovereign immunity. If we do resolve 
that issue, even if our conclusion is ultimately overturned, our decision 
on the merits will still assist the parties in their efforts to establish 
interconnection agreements. For that reason, and because we have 
persuasive precedent to follow, we have decided to move forward. 
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the authority to participate in the regulatory scheme is in 
fact a gift or gratuity to which Congress may attach as a 
condition the state's agreement to waive sovereign 
immunity and be sued in federal court and 2) whether 
Congress in the statute made clear, explicit, and 
unambiguous its intent that state utility commissions 
participating in the regulatory process would subject 
themselves to suit in federal court, so that the states can 
be said to have knowingly and voluntarily waived sovereign 




We conclude that under the Act the authority to regulate 
local telecommunications is a gratuity to which Congress 
may attach conditions, including a waiver of immunity to 
suit in federal court. Thus, the submission to suit in federal 
court, provided for in S 252(e)(6), is valid as a waiver, 
conditioned on the acceptance of a gratuity or gift, as 
permitted by College Savings. 
 
We find a gratuity because, with the 1996 Act, Congress 
federalized the regulation of competition for local 
telecommunications service. The Act preempted the 
regulation of interconnection agreements and of the terms 
on which a CLEC can provide competitive local service. 
Local telephone service had previously been a monopoly 
service within the exclusive regulatory province of the 
states. See Iowa Utils. I, 525 U.S. at 370. The 1996 Act 
fundamentally restructured local service by requiring 
competition and establishing the mechanisms by which 
competing carriers may enter the market. See id.  The Act, 
passed pursuant to Congress's power over interstate 
commerce (which is plenary, see Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. 
Department of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 98 
(1994)), validly preempted state regulation over competition 
to provide local telecommunications service. See Iowa Utils. 
I, 525 U.S. at 378 n.6 (stating that Congress 
"unquestionably" took the regulation of local 
telecommunications competition away from the states); see 
also Bellsouth, 238 F.3d at 646; MCI, 222 F.3d at 343; 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 216 F.3d at 938. 
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Congress could have made that preemption complete. It 
could have entirely eliminated any state role in regulating 
local competition and in conducting arbitration, review and 
approval of interconnection agreements, and it could have 
reserved to the FCC all such review and regulation. See 
Bellsouth, 238 F.3d at 646; MCI, 222 F.3d at 342; Bell Atl. 
Md., 240 F.3d at 316 (King, J., dissenting); see also FERC 
v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764 (1982) ("[T]he commerce 
power permits Congress to preempt the States entirely in 
the regulation of private utilities."). Congress instead 
preserved a role for state utility commissions in the federal 
regulatory scheme, giving them back some regulatory power 
by allowing them the first opportunity to conduct 
arbitrations and to approve or reject interconnection 
agreements. See 47 U.S.C. S 252(b)(1); 47 U.S.C. S 252(e)(1), 
(e)(2), (e)(4). 
 
Because Congress validly terminated the states' role in 
regulating local telephone competition and, having done so, 
then permitted the states to resume a role in that process, 
the resumption of that role by a state is a congressionally 
bestowed gratuity. The state commission's authority to 
regulate comes from S 252(b) and (e), not from its own 
sovereign authority. See MCI, 222 F.3d at 343. Regulating 
local telecommunications competition under the 1996 Act 
no longer is, in the words of College Savings , an "otherwise 
lawful" or "otherwise permissible" activity for a state. 
Rather, it is an activity in which states and state 
commissions are not entitled to engage except by the 
express leave of Congress. 
 
Indeed, the "states are not merely acting in an area 
regulated by Congress; they are now voluntarily regulating 
on behalf of Congress." MCI, 222 F.3d at 343; see Bellsouth, 
238 F.3d at 647 (stating that the state "accepted Congress's 
offer under the 1996 Act to delegate federal authority to the 
state commission"); Public Serv. Comm'n, 216 F.3d at 938 
(stating that the Act "invites states to participate in the 
federal government's regulation of local telephone service"). 
Because this opportunity for the states to exercise federal 
power is a gratuity from Congress, Congress may then 
attach to that grant of regulatory power any conditions it 
chooses. The condition which it did attach was the 
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submission to suit in federal court. Thus, when a state 
accepts that grant of regulatory power, it does so under the 
condition that it be subject to suit in federal court. See 
MCI, 222 F.3d at 344 n.10 ("By accepting the grant of 
regulatory power offered by Congress, and by allowing the 
state commission to exercise that power, [the states] cannot 
contend now that they are not bound by the conditions 
attached to that grant of power."). 
 
The PUC contends, however, that the power to regulate 
local telephone service is not a congressional gratuity but a 
primary aspect of core state sovereignty, a power the 
states have exercised exclusively for decades. This 
argument ignores the fundamental restructuring of 
telecommunications markets worked by the 1996 Act, see 
Iowa Utils. I, 525 U.S. at 370. Through the Act's 
restructuring, the federal government has "unquestionably" 
taken the regulation of local telecommunications 
competition away from the states. See id. at 378 n.6. 
Whatever the power of the states in the area of local 
telephone regulation prior to 1996, that power did not 
survive passage of the Act. State commissions now exercise 
power over local competition only pursuant to S 252(e) and 
only to the extent and in the manner provided by Congress. 
 
The fact that the PUC was required under pre-1996 state 
law to regulate local telephone service and that the pre- 
1996 law has not been repealed by the Pennsylvania 
legislature does not mean that the present participation by 
the PUC in regulation is not voluntary. The relationship 
between the state and the state utility commission under 
state law is irrelevant to the Eleventh Amendment analysis. 
If the state's participation in the federal scheme is 
voluntary, then its delegated commission's participation is 
also voluntary. And, as a result of the federal preemption, 
resulting from the Act, the decision by a state to regulate 
competition in the provision of local telecommunications 
service is a voluntary one. When, therefore, the state directs 
the state commission to participate in regulation under the 
Act, the commission's participation is also voluntary. 
 
Moreover, a state's participation in telecommunications 
regulation is not mandatory. If a state commission declines 
or fails to participate in arbitration or review of 
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interconnection agreements, responsibility for regulation 
falls to the FCC. See 47 C.F.R. SS 51.803-807. There is no 
requirement or obligation in federal law that a state 
participate in this regulation.5 A state or state commission's 
decision not to act is not subject to review. See 47 U.S.C. 
S 252(e)(6) (providing that an aggrieved party's only remedy 
if the state commission fails to act is to pursue its 
challenge to the agreement with the FCC). The state 
commission is "free to accept or reject such participation as 
a gratuity without abstaining from any lawful activity 
within its power." See Bellsouth, 238 F.3d at 647. A state or 
state commission wishing to preserve its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity may simply decline the invitation to 
regulate local competition on behalf of the federal 
government and allow that power to return to the FCC. 
Indeed, the state commission in Virginia has declined to 
resolve petitions to interpret and enforce interconnection 
agreements and the FCC has stepped in to exercise 
regulatory responsibility in Virginia. See FCC Order, In the 
Matter of Starpower Communications, LLC Petition for 
Preemption of Jurisdiction of the Virginia State Corporation 
Commission Pursuant to Section 252(3)(5) of the 1996 Act, 
CC Docket No. 00-52 (June 14, 2000). 
 
If the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania continues to direct 
the PUC to perform these regulatory functions, however, 
this decision by the Commonwealth, as delegated to the 





Even though we have concluded that the right to 
participate in the regulation of local telecommunications 
competition is a gratuity or benefit bestowed on the states 
by Congress, we must still determine whether Congress was 
unmistakably explicit, clear, and unambiguous inS 252(e) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. This voluntariness is critical. Because the state commissions are given 
a choice whether to participate in federal regulation, the Act cannot be 
said impermissibly to "commandeer" state regulatory agencies to enforce 
federal law. See MCI, 222 F.3d at 343 (citing Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 935 (1997)). 
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in providing that a state utility commission's determination, 
approving interconnection agreements affecting local 
telecommunications competition, would be subject to review 
in federal court. 
 
In considering whether S 252(e) is explicit, clear, and 
unambiguous, we look to its language and to the language 
of the Act as a whole. The regulatory process begins with 
negotiations by an ILEC and a CLEC to form an 
interconnection agreement. The Act provides that such an 
agreement, whether adopted through negotiation or 
arbitration, is submitted to the state utility commission, 
which reviews the agreement for consistency with the Act 
and the public interest and which approves or rejects the 
agreement. See 47 U.S.C. S 252(e)(1). The commission is 
also the first body to which carriers turn for arbitration if 
negotiations are unsuccessful or if issues remain 
unresolved. See 47 U.S.C. S 252(b)(1). The Act then provides 
that, when the state commission has made a determination 
on the agreement, "any party aggrieved by such 
determination may bring an action in an appropriate 
Federal district court," challenging whether the agreement 
meets the requirements of SS 251 and 252. See 47 U.S.C. 
S 252(e)(6). In other words, S 252(e)(6) specifically provides 
for "actions" in federal court brought by"aggrieved" parties 
to review "agreements" and "statements" approved by state 
utility commissions. Moreover, S 252(e)(4) provides that 
"[n]o State court shall have jurisdiction to review the action 
of a State commission in approving or rejecting an 
agreement under this section." See 47 U.S.C. S 252(e)(4). 
Federal jurisdiction for the review of commission decisions 
on interconnection agreements is exclusive. 
 
Consequently, a state commission that decides to 
participate in this statutory scheme is on notice from the 
outset that it will be subject to suit, brought only in federal 
court, by any party aggrieved by its decision. See MCI, 222 
F.3d at 337 (stating that SS 252(e)(4) and 252(e)(6), read 
together, indicate "that Congress envisioned suits reviewing 
`actions' by state commissions" and that "Congress 
intended that such suits be brought exclusively in federal 
court."). The statutory language places the state utility 
commission on notice that, by choosing to act on an 
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interconnection agreement and to make a decision as to its 
legality, it submits itself to the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. 
 
We agree with our sister circuits that this language 
constitutes a sufficiently clear congressional statement that 
a state will and must waive its sovereign immunity when it 
acts to regulate local competition agreements. See 
Bellsouth, 238 F.3d at 646; MCI, 222 F.3d at 341 ("[T]he 
1996 Telecommunications Act satisfies the requirement 
that Congress clearly state that participation by the state in 
the regulatory scheme entails a waiver of immunity from 
suit in federal court."); Public Serv. Comm'n , 216 F.3d at 
938 ("[Section] 252 puts Utah on notice that Congress 
intends to subject it to suits brought by individuals if it 
acts under S 252."); see also Bell Atl. Md., 240 F.3d at 314 
(King, J., dissenting) (arguing that the provisions of the Act 
"clearly show Congress's intent to subject participating 
states to suits in federal court"); but see Bell Atl. Md., 240 
F.3d at 292 (holding that Congress did not clearly manifest 
an intent to condition state commissions' participation in 
the regulatory scheme on a waiver of sovereign immunity). 
 
Moreover, a state commission is not obligated to waive 
sovereign immunity by participating in the regulatory 
process. The Act clearly provides that, if a state does not 
respond to a request to mediate or to arbitrate an 
interconnection agreement, the FCC is to assume that 
responsibility. For that reason, state participation in the 
regulation of local telecommunications competition is a 
choice, not a mandate. 
 
It is true that the Act does not include magic words such 
as "waiver" or "immunity" or "suit." The Act became 
effective in 1996, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Seminole Tribe that Congress may not abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity under the Commerce Clause and 
prior to the decision in College Savings overturning the 
constructive waiver doctrine of Parden. Perhaps, were 
Congress drafting the statute in 2001 with Seminole Tribe 
and College Savings in the mix, it would have been more 
explicit than it was. We believe, however, that the language 
that Congress did use is sufficiently clear to establish that 
a state commission's decision will be subject to review in an 
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action brought in federal court by an aggrieved party and 
sufficiently clear that the commission may be made a party 
to that federal court action. 
 
The argument is made in Bell Atl. Md. that the statute 
merely puts states on notice that their decisions will be 
subject to judicial review in federal court but that"it is a 
leap of logic to infer from this consent to federal-court 
review a consent by a State commission itself to be made a 
party to that federal review." 240 F.3d at 293; id. at 290. 
However, as the dissent in Bell Atl. Md. aptly states, 
consent to federal court review of a decision "necessarily 
entails" being made a party to the action. There is in fact 
no "leap of logic" from consent by a state commission to 
having its decision reviewed to consent by a state 
commission to being a party to that review. See id. at 314 
(King, J., dissenting). We agree that "by allowing State 
commissions to substitute as regulators for the FCC, 
Congress obviously intended that State commissions, just 
like the FCC, be made parties to federal court actions 
challenging their decisions." Id. at 315 (King, J., 
dissenting); see MCI, 222 F.3d at 337 (holding that the 
language of S 252(e) shows Congress's intent that state 
commissions be parties to the federal-court suits reviewing 
their decisions in the same way that the FCC is a party to 
the federal-court suits reviewing its actions). 
 
We hold therefore, along with the Fifth, Seventh, and 
Tenth Circuits, that the PUC is subject to suit in federal 
court under the 1996 Act because the PUC knowingly 
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by voluntarily 
accepting the congressional gift or gratuity of the power to 
regulate local telecommunications competition under the 
Act. The District Court had jurisdiction over the PUC and 
we affirm the court's rejection of the PUC's Eleventh 
Amendment arguments. 
 
2. Ex Parte Young 
 
In the alternative, we hold that the action against the 
individual PUC Commissioners is not barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment because the case presents, in the 
Sixth Circuit's terms, "a straightforward Ex Parte Young 
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case." Michigan Bell, 202 F.3d at 867. The Fifth, Seventh, 
and Tenth Circuit have all agreed. See Bellsouth , 238 F.3d 
at 647 (5th Cir.) (stating that the Act presents a 
straightforward application of Young); MCI, 222 F.3d at 345 
(7th Cir.) (holding that Eleventh Amendment does not bar 
telecommunications carriers from pursuing injunctive relief 
against individual members of state utility commissions); 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 216 F.3d at 939 (10th Cir.) (holding 
that telephone carrier could proceed against individual 
Commissioners); see also Bell Atl. Md., 240 F.3d at 317 
(King, J., dissenting) (agreeing with other circuits that suit 
under S 252(e)(6) was straightforward Young case); but see 
Bell Atl. Md., 240 F.3d at 294-95 (4th Cir.) (holding that 
Young did not permit suit against individual 
Commissioners). 
 
Application of Young here is, indeed, straightforward. As 
discussed in Part III A supra, we continue to view Young as 
generally applicable any time a plaintiff seeks prospective 
relief against individual state officers from an ongoing 
violation of federal law. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 296 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); see also Bellsouth, 238 F.3d at 648-49. 
 
Worldcom, AT&T, and Verizon all allege that various 
terms, rates, and conditions contained in the 
interconnection agreement established and approved by the 
PUC are inconsistent with and violative of the requirements 
of SS 251 and 252. Those terms and conditions govern and 
will continue to govern the current and future relations 
among the telephone carriers and the establishment of local 
competition in Pennsylvania by the parties to the 
agreement. The PUC (acting through the individual 
commissioners) is charged not only with establishing those 
original terms but also with overseeing the implementation 
and enforcement of the interconnection agreement against 
the parties. 
 
If the terms of the approved interconnection agreement 
do violate the Act, that violation constitutes an ongoing 
violation of federal law. The Commissioners individually are 
parties to the suit. The carriers seek prospective relief in a 
declaration that certain provisions of the approved 
interconnection agreement violate the Act and in an 
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injunction prohibiting enforcement of the agreement and 
requiring the PUC to establish different, more appropriate 
rates, terms, and conditions. This is the paradigmatic 
Young framework. See Bellsouth, 238 F.3d at 647; MCI, 222 
F.3d at 345; Public Serv. Comm'n, 216 F.3d at 939; 
Michigan Bell, 202 F.3d at 867. 
 
The Fourth Circuit is the only court of appeals to reach 
a different conclusion on the application of Young to the 
1996 Act. The majority there relied on Justice Kennedy's 
case-by-case balancing theory, set out by him in Coeur 
d'Alene, by which the federal interests served by permitting 
the suit against the Commissioners are balanced against 
the important values of state sovereignty. See Bell Atl. Md., 
240 F.3d at 295. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the 
federal interest in federal review could not overcome the 
"affront to the sovereignty" of the state in being brought 
before a federal court to defend a decision made when 
acting within the scope of its regulatory authority. See id. 
at 295, 298. As stated in Part III A, however, we have 
rejected the use of such a balancing approach to Young. We 
therefore decline to follow the decision in Bell Atl. Md. 
 
Moreover, we conclude that neither of the two recognized 
exceptions to Young bars the instant action. First, the 
"special sovereignty interests" exception, acknowledged by 
the majority of justices in Coeur d'Alene, is not implicated. 
The ability of a state to make and carry out its regulatory 
decisions, which would be interrupted by a federal court 
injunction and declaration that the decision of the PUC 
Commissioners violated federal law, cannot be viewed as a 
core or fundamental matter of state sovereignty comparable 
to the ability of a state to maintain ownership of and title 
to its submerged lands. See MCI, 222 F.3d at 348. Any 
sovereign interest that the Commonwealth might have in 
regulating local telephone competition exists solely by 
virtue of the role that Congress bestowed upon the states in 
S 252(e); the state interest in regulating in this area no 
longer derives from its general sovereign powers. See id. 
Thus, an action against the individual Commissioners no 
longer affects these general sovereign powers. 
 
Second, the Seminole Tribe exception for a detailed and 
limited remedial scheme is inapplicable. An aggrieved party 
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"may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district 
court to determine whether the agreement or statement 
meets the requirements" of the Act. See 47 U.S.C. 
S 252(e)(6). The Act places no restrictions on the scope of 
the court's review or on the remedies it may impose. It 
places no restrictions on the form and nature of prospective 
relief that an aggrieved party may obtain. The relief 
available in an action under S 252(e)(6) is precisely the relief 
that would be available through a Young action -- the full 
panoply of declaratory and injunctive remedies. See Bell Atl. 
Md., 240 F.3d at 318 (King, J., dissenting) (quoting Bell-Atl.- 
Delaware, Inc. v. Global Naps South, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 
492, 501 (D. Del. 1999)). 
 
We hold, consistent with the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Tenth Circuits, that this action may go forward against the 
individual PUC Commissioners under Ex Parte Young 
because the carriers seek prospective relief against the 
individual Commissioners to stop an ongoing violation of 
federal law. We will affirm the District Court on this 
alternative ground. 
 
IV. Verizon and PUC Appeals of the Merits 
 
The District Court addressed and resolved several 
challenges, raised by Worldcom (supported by intervenor 
AT&T) and by Verizon, to various terms, rates, and 
conditions contained in the Worldcom/Verizon 
interconnection agreement. Five such merits issues are 
before us on separate, consolidated appeals by the PUC and 
Verizon. 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
Before considering the merits of these issues, we must 
determine our standard of review. The District Court 
resolved the telecommunications challenges on summary 
judgment and our review of the District Court is plenary. 
See Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John LaBatt, Inc., 90 F.3d 
737, 743 (3d Cir. 1996). The more difficult question is the 
proper standard for reviewing the PUC's determinations as 
established in arbitration and contained in the approved 
interconnection agreement. Section 252(e)(6) provides for 
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judicial review and a determination whether the approved 
agreement "meets the requirements" of the Act, see 47 
U.S.C. S 252(e)(6), but does not prescribe the standard for 
that review. The District Court reviewed the PUC's 
interpretations of federal law de novo and its factual 
determinations under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard. 
 
The PUC argues that its interpretations of federal law 
contained in the interconnection agreement are entitled to 
deference under Chevron USA, Inc. v. National Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984), 
pursuant to which the construction of a federal statute by 
a federal agency is accorded deference by reviewing courts 
when there has been an explicit or implicit delegation of 
authority to an agency to fill a gap in the statute and the 
agency interpretation is a reasonable one. Chevron 
deference is warranted when the agency was given the 
power to make rules carrying the force of law and when the 
interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of 
that authority. See United States v. Mead Corp. , 121 S. Ct. 
2164, 2171 (2001). Delegation may be shown by the grant 
to an agency of power to engage in adjudication or notice- 
and-comment rulemaking. See id. at 2172. 
 
Generally, however, such deference is accorded to the 
interpretations of federal statutes by federal administrative 
agencies, not to interpretations by state agencies. See GTE 
South, 199 F.3d at 745 (quoting Orthopaedic Hosp. v. 
Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1495-96 (9th Cir. 1997)). The PUC 
argues for an exception to this general rule, given the 
unique structure of the Act by which Congress delegated 
federal regulatory power to state utility commissions and 
the commissions exercise federal power that the FCC 
otherwise would exercise. 
 
The PUC argues that its interpretations of federal law, 
made in reviewing and approving interconnection 
agreements, should be entitled to the same deference as 
would the FCC's interpretations if the FCC were primarily 
responsible for reviewing the agreements. Arguably, the 
state commissions do possess the same institutional 
competence as the FCC to make such decisions in the area 
of telecommunications law. See Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, 
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Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 
Vand. L. Rev. 1, 22-23 (1999). If the state commissions 
enjoy the confidence of Congress, they (and their 
interpretations of federal law) should enjoy similar 
confidence from the federal courts. See id. at 36. We reject 
this argument, however, and instead join the Ninth and 
Fourth Circuits in holding that a state utility commission's 
interpretations of the Act are reviewed de novo , not under 
Chevron, because the state commissions are not federal 
agencies to which deference is due. See MCI v. U.S. West, 
204 F.3d at 1266; GTE South, 199 F.3d at 745. 
 
Under the Act, there has been no delegation to state 
commissions of the power to fill gaps in the statute through 
binding rulemaking. See Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2171. The 
power to promulgate binding regulations to implement the 
requirements of the Act and to fill statutory gaps was 
granted to the FCC, see 47 U.S.C. S 251(d)(1), and those 
regulations are entitled to deference. See Mead , 121 S. Ct. 
at 2172 (stating that a good indicator of delegation meriting 
Chevron deference is an express congressional 
authorization for an agency to engage in the rulemaking 
process); see also Iowa Utils. II, 219 F.3d at 748-49 
(according Chevron deference to FCC rate regulations 
promulgated pursuant to S 251(d)(1)). State commissions 
have been given only the power to resolve issues in 
arbitration and to approve or reject interconnection 
agreements, not to issue rulings having the force of law 
beyond the relationship of the parties to the agreement. 
 
In fact, deference to the state commissions would often 
be impossible, given the explicit delegation of rulemaking 
authority to the FCC in S 251(d)(1). The interconnection 
agreement must comply with the Act and with FCC 
regulations; if the approved agreement, containing the state 
commission's interpretations of the law, conflicts with the 
legal interpretations in the FCC regulations, the FCC 
interpretation must control under the Supremacy Clause 
and under the plain language of the Act. If, therefore, the 
PUC's interpretation conflicts with that of the FCC, the 
PUC's determination must be struck down. 
 
Our conclusion not to accord deference to a state 
commission's interpretation of the Act is enforced by the 
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Supreme Court's recent decision in Mead which suggests 
that not every formal agency act involving interpretation of 
a federal statute is entitled to deference. See Mead, 121 S. 
Ct. at 2173 (holding that classification rulings by Customs 
Service not entitled to Chevron deference). 
 
We will, therefore, review any PUC legal interpretations 
contained in the arbitration and interconnection agreement 
de novo. We will review factual findings under a substantial 
evidence standard. See MCI v. U.S. West, 204 F.3d at 1267; 
GTE South, 199 F.3d at 745. Under the substantial 
evidence test, we must uphold a decision that has 
"substantial support in the record as a whole." See GTE 
South, 199 F.3d at 746 (citations omitted). 
 
B. Terms of the Interconnection Agreement 
 
1. Interconnection in Access Tandem Serving Areas 
 
The first merits issue we must consider is the PUC's 
requirement that Worldcom interconnect in each access 
tandem serving area, even when there is more than one 
access tandem area within a single LATA. It is Worldcom's 
position that it need interconnect only once within each 
LATA. 
 
The Act provides that a CLEC must be permitted to 
interconnect "at any technically feasible point within the 
carrier's network." 47 U.S.C. S 251(c)(2)(B). An ILEC that 
denies interconnection at a particular point must prove 
that interconnection at that point is not technically feasible. 
See 47 C.F.R. S 51.305(e). Generally, these provisions have 
been interpreted to permit a CLEC to have access at any 
point on the incumbent network where connection is 
technically feasible. See, e.g., U.S. West Communications v. 
AT&T Communications of the Pac. Northwest, Inc., 31 F. 
Supp. 2d 839, 852 (D. Or. 1998) (AT&T-Pac). 
 
The instant case presents a twist on the usual situation. 
Verizon, as ILEC, is not attempting to deny Worldcom, as 
CLEC, access to the network at a particular point or points, 
nor is Verizon attempting to require that Worldcom 
interconnect at another point than the one at which 
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Worldcom chooses to interconnect. Rather, Verizon wants 
Worldcom to take access at several additional points in the 
network, to interconnect at multiple points within the 
LATA, even if Worldcom does not want to do so. The PUC 
and Verizon contend that, because the Act and the FCC 
regulations do not specify whether a CLEC may be required 
to interconnect at additional points or how many points of 
interconnection a CLEC may be required to have, the issue 
is left to the PUC's discretion. 
 
To the degree that a state commission may have 
discretion in determining whether there will be one or more 
interconnection points within a LATA, the commission, in 
exercising that discretion, must keep in mind whether the 
cost of interconnecting at multiple points will be 
prohibitive, creating a bar to competition in the local service 
area. See AT&T-Pac., 31 F. Supp. 2d at 852. If only one 
interconnection is necessary, the requirement by the 
commission that there be additional connections at an 
unnecessary cost to the CLEC, would be inconsistent with 
the policy behind the Act. 
 
Moreover, the fact that S 251(c)(2) permits the CLEC to 
choose the points in the network at which to interconnect 
suggests that the Act provides for a balanced resolution in 
the determination of interconnection points: While the ILEC 
cannot be required to allow interconnection at technically 
unfeasible points, similarly the CLEC cannot be required to 
interconnect at points where it has not requested to do so. 
If we accept this proposition, the PUC and Verizon cannot 
require Worldcom to interconnect at any point in the 
network at which Worldcom does not wish to interconnect. 
 
The decision where to interconnect and where not to 
interconnect must be left to Worldcom, subject only to 
concerns of technical feasibility. Verizon has not presented 
evidence that it is not technically feasible for Worldcom to 
interconnect at only one point within a LATA. Nor has 
Verizon shown that it is technically necessary for Worldcom 
to interconnect at each access tandem serving area. The 
PUC's requirement that Worldcom interconnect at these 
additional points is not consistent with the Act. We will 
affirm the District Court's decision, rejecting the PUC's 
interconnection requirements. To the extent, however, that 
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Worldcom's decision on interconnection points may prove 
more expensive to Verizon, the PUC should consider 
shifting costs to Worldcom. See 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 P 209 
(1996). 
 
2. Remote Switching Modules 
 
The PUC determined that Worldcom would be permitted 
to collocate RSMs in Verizon's offices. The District Court 
affirmed this portion of the interconnection agreement. This 
ruling was consistent with the original interpretation of the 
Act by the FCC. The Act provides that CLECs are permitted 
to collocate equipment "necessary for interconnection or 
access to unbundled network elements." 47 U.S.C. 
S 251(c)(6). At the outset, the FCC interpreted "necessary" 
to mean not indispensable, but "used or useful" for 
interconnection, regardless whether other equipment could 
be used to perform the same functions. See Local 
Competition Order P 579. The FCC found that this definition 
was most consistent with the pro-competitive purposes of 
the Act, as it permitted CLECs to interconnect with greater 
efficiency and at less cost. Id. The FCC further found that 
this definition applied regardless whether the equipment 
contained other functions, such as switching. See In the 
Matter of Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761P 28 
(1999) (Wireline Services Order); see also 47 C.F.R. 
S 51.323(c) (providing that ILECs may not place any 
limitations on the ability of CLECs to use all the features, 
functions, and capability of collocated equipment, including 
switching and routing features). An ILEC objecting to 
collocation of a piece of equipment was required to prove 
"that the equipment will not be actually used by the 
telecommunications carrier for the purpose of obtaining 
interconnection." 47 C.F.R. S 51.323(b). The ILEC also had 
to show that there were technical or space limitations 
proscribing collocation. 47 U.S.C. S 251(c)(6). 
 
The D.C. Circuit, however, vacated P 28 of the Wireline 
Services Order and required the FCC to give a"better 
explanation" for the requirement that a CLEC be permitted 
to collocate equipment beyond that which is "necessary, 
required, or indispensable" to interconnection. GTE Serv. 
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Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The court 
held that the FCC's interpretation of "necessary" was too 
broad, particularly in that it would require collocation of 
any and all equipment that is used for interconnection, 
without regard to whether such equipment unnecessarily 
included other features, such as switching. Id.  The court 
rejected the FCC's consideration of cost savings and 
efficiency in broadening the meaning of "necessary," holding 
that such considerations had been rejected by the Supreme 
Court. Id. at 424 (citing Iowa Utils. I , 525 U.S. at 390). 
 
The FCC has now reissued the collocation rules in the 
Collocation Remand Order, to take effect September 19, 
2001. In the new Order, the FCC has declared that it will 
allow collocation of "dramatically smaller,""innovative 
equipment," including "remote switching modules, which 
are small switches that are used in conjunction with host 
switches located in different premises." Collocation Remand 
Order at PP 47 & n.133, 48. We conclude that under this 
new Order the PUC's ruling allowing collocation of RSMs 
was proper. 
 
Moreover, both the Fourth and the Ninth Circuits have 
held that RSMs are used for interconnection and can be a 
necessary piece of equipment that an ILEC may be required 
to collocate. See U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. 
Hamilton, 224 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2000); AT&T- 
Virginia, Inc. v. Bell Atl.-Virginia, Inc., 197 F.3d 663, 669 
(4th Cir. 1999); see also MCI v. U.S. West, 204 F.3d at 
1268-69 (holding, in action brought by ILEC, that provision 
of agreement requiring ILEC to permit collocation of remote 
switching units was not proscribed by the Act and was 
valid); AT&T-Pac., 31 F. Supp. 2d at 854 (upholding state 
utility commission decision requiring collocation of remote 
switching unit). 
 
In choosing the equipment to be used for 
interconnection, Worldcom cannot be required to strip 
down its network to its bare essentials and to use 
equipment that performs only a single function, resulting in 
a less efficient and cost-effective network and, presumably, 
in higher consumer prices. Verizon's interpretation-- that 
equipment is not necessary for interconnection merely 
because it can perform other functions or because some 
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other equipment could be used instead -- is incompatible 
with the reissued Collocation Remand Order and with the 
policy behind the Act. We will therefore affirm the District 
Court's decision on collocation of RSMs. 
 
3. Wholesale Rates 
 
Verizon argues that the District Court erred in approving 
the wholesale rates to be charged to Worldcom for services 
to be resold under S 251(c)(4)(A). We agree with Verizon and 
will reverse the District Court's decision on this point. 
 
The Act requires ILECs to "offer for resale at wholesale 
rates any telecommunications service that the [incumbent] 
carrier provides at retail to subscribers who are not 
telecommunications carriers." See 47 U.S.C. S 251(c)(4)(A). 
Wholesale rates are to be determined based on retail rates 
charged to subscribers, excluding "the portion thereof 
attributable to any marketing, billing, collection, and other 
costs that will be avoided by the local exchange carrier." 
See 47 U.S.C. S 252(d)(3) (emphasis added). The FCC 
interpreted the pricing standard to be the retail rate, less 
"avoided retail costs," see 47 C.F.R.S 51.607; avoided 
retails costs are "those costs that reasonably can be 
avoided when an incumbent LEC provides a 
telecommunications service for resale at wholesale rates to 
a requesting carrier." See 47 C.F.R.S 51.609(b) (emphasis 
added). This is the standard that the PUC applied in setting 
the rates contained in the interconnection agreement. 
 
The "reasonably can be avoided" standard was struck 
down by the Eighth Circuit as contrary to the Act. See Iowa 
Utils. II, 219 F.3d at 755-56.6 The court determined that the 
word "will" indicated certainty or actuality, meaning the 
statute excluded from the wholesale rates only those costs 
certainly and actually avoided in providing services to a 
CLEC for resale. See id. at 755. The Act recognizes that an 
ILEC will continue to provide its own retail telephone 
services to consumers and will continue to incur the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Certiorari was not granted on this point. See Iowa Utils. II, 121 S. 
Ct. 
878 (2001) (granting certiorari on 3 issues). That aspect of the Eighth 
Circuit's decision is final. 
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general costs of providing retail services. See id. The 
"reasonably can be avoided" standard would exclude from 
the wholesale rates all costs that could be associated with 
all provision of retail telephone services to all retail 
customers, regardless whether the ILEC is avoiding such 
costs in its sales to the CLEC. A standard based on 
"actually avoided" costs should, however, focus on the costs 
avoided in sales made to the CLEC, while recognizing that 
the ILEC will continue other retail sales. See id. 
 
We agree with the Eighth Circuit that the wholesale rates 
must be based on the costs actually avoided by Verizon in 
its wholesale sales to Worldcom or to any other CLEC. A 
wholesale rate such as the one set by the PUC, based on 
costs that could be but were not actually avoided, is 
inconsistent with the language of the Act and cannot stand. 
 
We conclude that the PUC erred in setting the wholesale 
rates for services sold to Worldcom for resale. We will 
remand this issue to the District Court with orders to 
remand to the PUC for a new determination of wholesale 
rates, applying whatever new rate standard the FCC 
promulgates on remand from Iowa Utils. II. 7 
 
4. Directory Publishing Services 
 
The PUC ordered Verizon to provide to Worldcom 
directory publishing services at wholesale prices. The 
District Court rejected the recommendation, vacating this 
portion of the agreement. 
 
Verizon must offer at wholesale rates "any 
telecommunications service" to be resold by Worldcom. See 
47 U.S.C. S 251(c)(4)(A). A telecommunications service is the 
"offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the 
public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively 
available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities 
used." See 47 U.S.C. S 153(46). Telecommunications means 
"transmission, between or among points specified by the 
user, of information of the user's choosing, without change 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. MCI does not contest this result. It recognizes that the FCC will 
promulgate new wholesale pricing regulations and that the PUC will 
apply that standard on remand. 
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in the form or content of the information as sent and 
received." See 47 U.S.C. S 153(43). Directory publishing 
services include basic listings with customer telephone 
numbers, as well as additional services such as vanity 
numbers, bold and foreign listings in the White Pages, and 
non-listing and non-publication of customers' telephone 
numbers. 
 
At issue is the price that Verizon may charge Worldcom 
for directory publishing services, which requires that we 
decide if directory publishing services are 
telecommunications services under the relevant statutory 
definitions. If they are, Verizon must charge wholesale 
rates. See 47 U.S.C. S 252(c)(4)(A). If they are not, Verizon 
may charge the tariffed rates. The District Court held that 
the statutory definitions could not be strained to include 
directory publishing services as telecommunications 
services. We agree.8 
 
The PUC argues that it is undisputed that directory 
publishing services are retail tariff service offerings, that is, 
services offered by Verizon to retail customers at prices 
established in tariffs filed with the FCC or the PUC. While 
this perhaps is true, it is irrelevant. Section 251(c)(4) does 
not require the wholesale provision of all retail tariff 
services that an ILEC offers to subscribers, only the 
wholesale provision of telecommunications services. The 
two categories are not coextensive. All retail tariff services 
are not telecommunications services, given the limited 
definitions of S 153(43) and (46). Telecommunications 
services involve the offering of telecommunications, the 
transmission of information. Directory publishing services 
do not involve the transmission of information and do not 
fall within the statutory definitions. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We have found no cases addressing whether directory publishing 
services fit within the definitions of telecommunications services. We 
have found cases holding that directory publishing services are network 
elements within the meaning of S 153(29) that must be sold at the cost- 
based rates of S 252(d)(1). See AT&T-Va. , 197 F.3d at 674-75; Bell-Atl.- 
Delaware, Inc. v. McMahon, 80 F. Supp. 2d 218, 251-52 (D. Del. 2000). 
These decisions, however, are not persuasive on the question of whether 
directory publishing services are telecommunications services, subject to 
a different statutory definition and a different pricing standard. 
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Verizon is not required to provide directory publishing 
services to Worldcom at wholesale prices for resale. It may 
provide such services at tariffed rates or at some other 
rates to be determined in a new interconnection agreement 
on remand to the PUC. We will therefore affirm the District 
Court on this issue. 
 
5. Price of Unbundled Network Elements 
 
The District Court held that the PUC's pricing model for 
the leasing of unbundled network elements did not use a 
forward-looking TELRIC pricing methodology, but an 
improper TSLRIC model. The court remanded the issue to 
the PUC to apply the proper pricing model. The District 
Court never addressed the PUC's actual application of its 
methodology or the details of the pricing decision that the 
PUC reached. We will vacate the District Court's decision 
and remand this issue to the District Court to review the 
details and substance, as opposed to the nomenclature, of 
the pricing model that the PUC used and the pricing 
decision it made. 
 
The PUC must determine the "just and reasonable rate" 
to be charged for access to unbundled network elements, a 
rate that must be nondiscriminatory and "based on the cost 
. . . of providing the . . . network element," along with a 
reasonable profit for the ILEC. See 47 U.S.C. S 252(d)(1)(A), 
(B); Iowa Utils. II, 219 F.3d at 749. The FCC has 
promulgated regulations establishing the methodology for 
determining the rates to be charged. See Iowa Utils. I, 525 
U.S. at 384-85 (holding that FCC has jurisdiction to design 
a pricing methodology). 
 
The rate must be based on the forward-looking TELRIC of 
a discrete network element plus a "reasonable allocation of 
forward-looking common costs." See 47 C.F.R. S 515.505(a). 
TELRIC is the "forward-looking cost over the long run of the 
total quantity of the facilities and functions that are directly 
attributable to, or reasonably identifiable as incremental to, 
such element, calculated taking as a given the incumbent 
LEC's provision of other elements." See 47 C.F.R. 
S 51.505(b). 
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We note several points about the FCC pricing regulations. 
First, TELRIC "should be measured based on the use of the 
most efficient telecommunications technology currently 
available and the lowest cost network configuration, given 
the existing location of the incumbent LEC's wire centers." 
See 47 C.F.R. S 51.505(b)(1). Second, forward-looking costs 
are "economic costs efficiently incurred in providing a group 
of elements or services." See 47 C.F.R.S 51.505(c)(1). Third, 
the sum of TELRIC and a reasonable allocation of forward- 
looking common costs "shall not exceed the stand-alone 
costs associated with the element." See 47 C.F.R. 
S 51.505(c)(2). 
 
The Eighth Circuit struck down the FCC's TELRIC 
methodology, holding that S 51.505(b)(1) was inconsistent 
with the statutory language, in that it based prices on what 
the cost would be of particular elements if the ILEC 
provided the most efficient technology in the most efficient 
configuration of a hypothetical efficient network, rather 
than the actual cost of providing the elements of the actual, 
existing network. See Iowa Utils. II, 219 F.3d at 750; id. 
(stating that Congress did not intend rates to be based on 
the cost some imaginary ILEC would incur, but on the 
actual costs that ILECs incurred in sharing network 
elements). The Eighth Circuit did hold that a forward- 
looking pricing methodology, if based on actual incremental 
costs incurred or that will be incurred by an ILEC, would 
produce a price consistent with the Act. See id.  at 752-53. 
The court also rejected the argument that cost under 
S 252(d)(1)(A) must mean historical costs. See id. at 751. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on these issues, see 
FCC v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 121 S. Ct. 878 (2001), leaving 
undecided the question of whether prices can be based on 
a hypothetical efficient network configuration until the 
Supreme Court determines the validity of the FCC 
regulations during its next term. 
 
The FCC explained the terms TSLRIC and TELRIC. Under 
TSLRIC, "total service" refers to the entire quantity of the 
service (either single service or a class of similar services) 
that a firm produces, along with the costs of dedicated 
facilities and operations used in providing that service. See 
Local Competition Order P 677. The FCC coined and adopted 
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the term TELRIC in the Local Competition Order  to describe 
a different version of that methodology, one based on the 
specific network element or elements to be priced. See id. 
P 678. Essentially, TELRIC appears to be an unbundled 
version of TSLRIC methodology, pricing discrete network 
elements rather than entire services. The PUC and Verizon 
argued that the required TELRIC methodology was a 
version of TSLRIC and that the PUC's pricing model was 
proper. 
 
The PUC set prices based on what it labeled a TSLRIC  
methodology.9 But in reviewing that decision, the District 
Court did not look any further than the acronym applied by 
the PUC to determine whether, in fact, the PUC based 
prices on the forward-looking costs of discrete network 
elements. The record suggests that the PUC attempted to 
use a forward-looking, element-based methodology and 
believed that it had done so. The labels that the PUC used 
apparently confused the issue. 
 
The PUC's use of the TSLRIC acronym without more, 
however, does not provide a basis for vacating the pricing 
decision. The District Court never reviewed the substance 
of the pricing standard, never considered whether the 
inputs that the PUC used in setting prices (based on the 
pricing model offered by Verizon) were proper or whether 
the prices it established were consistent with the Act. This 
determination is primarily a factual issue, subject to 
substantial evidence review, that must be performed by the 
District Court in the first instance. 
 
We will remand this issue to the District Court with 
instructions to review the substance and merits of the PUC 
methodology and its pricing decision and, with the 
guidance of the Supreme Court's expected ruling on the 
validity of the FCC regulations, to determine whether the 
prices for unbundled network elements established in the 
interconnection agreement comport with the Act. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. See A-1378 ("[W]e adopted the use of TSLRIC as the appropriate cost 
methodology to set prices for unbundled elements.") 
 





For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court's denial of the PUC's and Commissioners' claims of 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. As to the terms 
of the interconnection agreement, we will reverse the 
District Court's decision with respect to the wholesale rates 
set by the PUC and the pricing of unbundled network 
elements; we will affirm the District Court in all other 
respects. We remand this case to the District Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part: 
 
Judge Roth has written an exceptional opinion for the 
Court. I agree with its reasoning and conclusion that the 
Commonwealth has waived its sovereign immunity by 
regulating local telephone service in Pennsylvania within 
the confines of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
Nonetheless, I write separately to emphasize that our 
holding, and indeed the holdings of the many courts of 
appeals that have taken the same position, is a novel one 
and should be so recognized. I also write separately to 
dissent from the Court's holding that the collocation of 





We hold today that the 1996 Telecommunications Act fits 
within the narrow exception for "gratuity waivers" discussed 
in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 686-87 (1999). 
The "gratuity waiver" is an exception from the general rule, 
set forth in College Savings Bank, that no constructive 
waiver of sovereign immunity can be inferred from a state's 
involvement in an area subject to federal regulation. See id. 
at 686. There is reason to argue, however, that we are 
expanding the scope of the "gratuity waiver" exception 
beyond the examples given in College Savings Bank. 
 
In discussing the general rule that there can be no 
"constructive waiver" of Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
and the resultant overruling of Parden v. Terminal R. of 
Alabama Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), the Supreme 
Court emphasized that effective waivers of sovereign 
immunity, like other constitutional rights, must involve the 
"intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right or privilege." College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 682 
(citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
Requiring a state to possess knowledge of its immunity and 
to intend to waive that immunity imparts upon the state a 
requirement of volition -- it must wish to waive its 
immunity. 
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Moreover, the Court in College Savings Bank noted one 
other component of effective waiver; it requires a" `clear 
declaration' by the State of its waiver . . . to be certain that 
the State in fact consents to suit." Id. at 680 (emphasis in 
original). This expression of intentional relinquishment 
must be unequivocal. Id. That is, not only must the waiver 
be clear, but the state cannot equivocate in expressing its 
intent. Under these standards, it is the rare case that a 
federal court would find the waiver of sovereign immunity. 
 
Despite the Supreme Court's invocation of these two 
hallmarks of effective sovereign immunity waiver-- 
intention and clarity of expression -- it left a vestige of 
constructive waiver in those situations in which the waiver 
is exacted as a condition to the state's acceptance of 
Congress's gratuity. College Sav. Bank at 686-87. The 
Court cited two cases in support of the concept of"gratuity 
waiver," Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 
U.S. 275 (1959), and South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 
(1987). In Petty, Congress approved a bistate commission 
created by an interstate compact containing a clause 
allowing suit. Petty, 359 U.S. at 277-78. The Court in 
College Savings Bank concluded that because states were 
barred from forming such compacts by the Constitution, 
Congress's consent to a compact was a gratuity in that it 
granted powers to a state entity previously denied to it. 
More importantly for our purposes, the Supreme Court held 
that this gratuity -- the approval of an interstate compact 
-- could be conditioned on the waiver of sovereign 
immunity and that courts could infer waiver from the 
state's acceptance of that gratuity. College Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. at 686. Similarly, in South Dakota v. Dole , states 
received funding from the federal government conditioned 
on each state's acceptance of a uniform drinking age. 483 
U.S. at 205. In both cases, Congress lacked the power to 
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity (in Petty) or require 
a mandatory drinking age (in Dole), but Congress's grant of 
a gratuity permitted it to require as a condition of the gift 
the very waiver or action it could not accomplish in its own 
right. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 686. 
 
Notably, in both cases cited in College Savings Bank, it 
was entirely clear to the state from the face of the statute 
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itself that it was agreeing to Congress's condition. For 
example, in Petty, Congress "approved a sue-and-be-sued 
clause in a compact under conditions that make it clear 
that the States accepting it waived any immunity from suit 
which they otherwise might have." Petty, 359 U.S. at 280. 
Similarly, the statute at issue in Dole so clearly exacted a 
condition on the grant of highway funds that the State of 
South Dakota itself sued to establish its 
unconstitutionality. Dole, 483 U.S. at 205. Thus, we can 
assume that for "gratuity waivers" the clarity the Court 
demanded in College Savings Bank, for the state's 
expression of waiver has simply shifted sources. Rather 
than requiring a " `clear declaration' by the State," College 
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680, we now require a clear 
declaration from Congress that, by accepting the gratuity, 
the states will forfeit whatever rights Congress chooses to 
attach as a condition.1 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. 
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (finding an act of 
Congress does not clearly evince its intention to require 
states receiving funds to waive their sovereign immunity). 
 
This requirement of clarity on Congress's part is a 
necessary component of inferring from a state's actions its 
decision to waive its sovereign immunity. Congress's clarity 
of expression and the resulting action by the state 
substitute for the state's own expression of waiver. It is in 
satisfaction of this requirement of a "constructive waiver" 
that the courts of appeals have concluded that the 1996 
Telecommunications Act clearly expresses Congress's 
intention to attach a condition to its gratuity of regulatory 
authority over local telephone service. See Maj. Opinion at 
23-24 (listing cases); but see Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc. v. 
MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 293 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[a] 
State official reading this provision would have no 
indication that the State commission, if it chose to make 
the reviewable determination, would be compelled to appear 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This mirrors the requirement that Congress's abrogation of sovereign 
immunity be clear and unequivocal. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 
343-44 (1979). Of course, abrogation and waiver are closely related. 
"Forced waiver and abrogation are not even different sides of the same 
coin--they are the same side of the same coin." College Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. at 683. 
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in federal court at the behest of an aggrieved 
telecommunications company"). 
 
Clarity, however, is only half of the requirements of 
effective waiver. As noted above, the Supreme Court 
emphasized in College Savings Bank that a waiver of 
sovereign immunity must also be "intentional." 527 U.S. at 
682. The "gratuity waiver" of the Commonwealth that we 
approve today lacks on its face any indicia of being 
intentional. The Pennsylvania Utility Commission has 
steadfastly maintained that it did not intend to waive its 
immunity from suit and that its arbitration and approval of 
the interconnection agreement was an action taken 
pursuant to state law, not the 1996 Act. Of course, we 
recognized in the majority opinion that the 1996 Act 
federalized the provision of local telephone services and 
therefore rejected the PUC's reliance on state authority. See 
Majority Op. at 26-27; AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 
U.S. 366, 378 n.6 (1999) ("With regard to the matters 
addressed by the 1996 Act, [Congress has] unquestionably 
[taken the regulation of local telecommunications 
competition away from the States]"). 
 
Nonetheless, the PUC's reliance on state law is 
interesting for another reason. Unlike Petty and Dole, the 
PUC has not made any affirmative manifestation of its 
acceptance of Congress's gratuity, such as the new 
operation of a bistate commission or acceptance of federal 
highway funds. Instead, it has merely continued what it 
has always done -- regulate local telephone service for 
Pennsylvanians. When Congress has taken away the PUC's 
authority with one hand and returned it (albeit in a new 
framework) with the other, it is difficult to understand what 
it is that the PUC has to do to manifest its acceding to 
Congress's condition that it waive sovereign immunity. 
Indeed, we have no indication here that Pennsylvania 
intended to waive its sovereign immunity at all, 2 other than 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This stands in stark contrast to states such as Delaware, for example, 
which has authorized its utility commission to act pursuant to the 1996 
Act. See Bell Atlantic-Delaware v. McMahon, 80 F. Supp. 2d 218, 232 (D. 
Del. 2000); 26 Del. Code S 703(4) (1998). While the Delaware General 
Assembly did not expressly waive its sovereign immunity by this statute, 
it is evidence that the State intended to accept the benefit of regulating 
under its mandate. See Bell Atlantic-Delaware , 80 F. Supp. 2d at 232 
n.10. 
 
                                50 
 
 
its continued presence in a field of regulation in which it 
has operated for the better portion of the twentieth century. 
 
Thus, our case stands for the proposition that a"gratuity 
waiver" can exist even without conduct expressly accepting 
that gratuity, if Congress is sufficiently clear in structuring 
its condition. It is not simply that Congress has said that 
states will waive their sovereign immunity if they accept the 
new authority. Congress has said that if states continue to 
act as they have, they will waive their sovereign immunity, 
and thus has mandated that the states take action if they 
do not wish to waive their immunity. Conversely, the 
affirmative act indicating an intention to accept the gratuity 
is not the simple acceptance of new money or new 
authority, it is the failure to refuse the grant of an authority 
previously possessed.3 
 
Because I believe that questions of the constitutional 
viability of "cooperative federalism" will repeat themselves 
as long as Congress continues to fashion such creative 
regulatory regimes, we should acknowledge this novelty. 
See College Sav. Bank, 537 U.S. at 702-03 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the need for legislative flexibility to 
foster national uniformity in regulation while preserving 
local control). With as yet no Supreme Court determination 
with respect to the issue before us, I believe that the 
efficacy of "cooperative federalism" requires our Court's 
flexibility in this instance. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. If we recognize that the constructive waiver in this case is inferred 
based on a state's continuing regulation of telecommunications, and not 
any affirmative acceptance of the 1996 Act, one might conclude that 
Congress has skirted dangerously close to creating a sanction and not 
the grant of a gratuity. The Court in College Savings Bank suggested a 
distinction between a condition placed on a gift and a sanction--the 
former being an acceptable means of securing the waiver of sovereign 
immunity from a state and the latter not. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 
687. A sanction exists if Congress excludes "the State from otherwise 
permissible activity." Id. As the majority correctly notes, because the 
1996 Act removes local telephone regulation from the states and because 
doing so is wholly lawful, see Hodel v. Virgina Surface Mining and 
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 290 (1981), it is not a sanction. Maj. 
Op. at 26-27. Thus, while Pennsylvania has waived its sovereign 
immunity without an affirmative expression of its acceptance of a 
gratuity, it is nevertheless a gratuity that it has received. 
 





I also respectfully dissent from the majority's 
interpretation of collocation requirements of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act. The Act forces ILECs "to provide, 
on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, 
and nondiscriminatory, for physical collocation of 
equipment necessary for interconnection or access to 
unbundled network elements at the premises of the local 
exchange carrier." 47 U.S.C. S 251(c)(6) (emphasis added). 
 
The majority affirms the District Court's order affirming 
the PUC's determination that Worldcom be permitted to 
collocate remote switching modules in Verizon's offices. 
Instead, I would adopt the position that locating remote 
switching modules in the central offices of an ILEC 
(Verizon) is not "necessary to interconnect" to the ILEC's 
network. 47 U.S.C. S 251(c)(6); see GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 
205 F.3d 416, 423-24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (FCC regulations 
permitting collocation of remote switching modules exceeds 
the reach of S 251(c)(6) by interpreting "necessary" to mean 
efficient or useful). 
 
While the majority correctly notes that the FCC has 
promulgated new regulations in response to the D.C. 
Circuit's ruling in GTE Serv. Corp., those regulations 
continue to permit the collocation of remote switching 
modules without regard for Congress's express limitations 
in S 251(c)(6) to those devices "necessary" to interconnect. 
The majority's reasoning is plausible. Yet it has substituted 
its responsibility to interpret what "necessary" means with 
broad policy statements regarding what it believes to be the 
most efficient means of accomplishing collocation. 
Assuming the remote switching devices result in certain 
efficiencies, they are not necessary for interconnection of 
CLECs to the ILEC's network. Because I would adopt the 
position of the D.C. Circuit that the term "necessary" 
constrains the authority of the PUC to mandate collocation 
of devices that do more than provide the essential 
interconnection required by the Telecommunications Act, I 
respectfully dissent. 
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